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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What is more believable: that an experienced criminal 
would risk his life by attempting to rob armed drug dealers in 
close quarters, or that while unarmed he would go into a drug 
den to demand a refund of $50 that he spent at the den for 
cocaine that he discovered was fake?  And once inside, is it 
more likely that, while taking open gun fire from behind, he 
would turn around to shoot back rather than flee, or that he 
would dive at a weapon about to be discharged at him?  The jury 
in the criminal trial of the allegedly defrauded habeas corpus 
petitioner, Horace Branch, the appellant in this case, struggled 
with these questions.  It sent a stream of notes to the trial court, 
prompting the court to respond at one point that it “can give you 
no more than what you heard.”  J.A. 330.  In the end, the jury 
returned a mixed verdict, crediting the part of the prosecution’s 
case charging that Branch shot the victim after entering the 
premises, but not the part charging Branch with robbing some of 
the den’s occupants at the time of the shooting.   
We are not concerned on this appeal from the denial of a 
petition for habeas corpus with whether the evidence supported 
the verdict to the extent that the jury found Branch guilty.  But 
we are concerned with the jury’s apparent struggle in reaching 
its verdict, as well as the questionable theory of the 
prosecution’s case and the questionable character of its shaky 
witnesses, as these factors are relevant to the question we face 
today: whether the state courts that reviewed Branch’s petition 
for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) unreasonably applied federal 
law in holding that his trial counsel was not constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to call two potentially exculpatory 
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witnesses.  In particular, Branch anticipated that these witnesses, 
in testimony consistent with their written sworn pretrial 
statements, which he claims he passed on to his counsel before 
the trial, would have corroborated his account of the events at 
the time of the shooting and alleged robberies.  Branch 
submitted these witnesses’ sworn statements to the state PCR 
court and asked for an evidentiary hearing on his counsel’s 
effectiveness.
1
  The PCR court rejected his request and denied 
Branch relief.  Branch appealed, and the Appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the PCR court’s order 
denying Branch relief with respect to the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim before us.     
Branch subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus in 
the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Without 
holding an evidentiary hearing, the Court adopted the PCR 
court’s reasoning and, by order of February 11, 2013, denied 
                                                 
1
 In our November 21, 2013 order granting a certificate of 
appealability, we allowed Branch to expand the record to the 
extent of permitting him to submit documents filed in the trial 
level state PCR court, showing that he had raised the precise 
claim in that court that he later made in the habeas corpus 
proceedings in the District Court, and that he requested an 
evidentiary hearing in the state PCR court on his trial counsel’s 
effectiveness.  Appellees, who we will call the State, do not 
contend that Branch’s petition is untimely, that Branch has not 
fully exhausted his state court remedies, or that for any reason 
he is procedurally barred from raising the issues we address on 
this appeal.  
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Branch’s petition.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
indicated that the proposed witnesses’ testimony was 
“cumulative” and that Branch’s trial counsel could have based 
his decision not to call the witnesses on his trial strategy.   
 After examining the state-court record, we cannot find 
any justification for Branch’s trial counsel’s failure to call the 
two potential witnesses to testify at Branch’s trial.  If Branch’s 
counsel had called those witnesses and they adhered to their 
pretrial written statements, there is a reasonable probability that 
the relatively balanced scale of evidence at Branch’s trial would 
not have been tilted in the State’s favor.  The state courts’ 
conclusions that Branch’s counsel’s representation was not 
deficient and that his counsel’s failure to call the witnesses did 
not prejudice Branch were unreasonable applications of federal 
law, and the District Court therefore was required to review 
Branch’s petition de novo.  That review, in turn, would have 
required the Court to hold a hearing to ascertain trial counsel’s 
reasons for not calling the potential witnesses.  Because the 
Court did not take these steps, it abused its discretion, and 
therefore we will vacate the order of February 11, 2013, denying 
the petition for habeas corpus and will remand the case to the 
District Court for further proceedings.  We specifically direct 
the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether 
Branch’s counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of 
counsel because he did not call these potential witnesses to 
testify at trial.   
          
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
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On November 4, 1993, Branch entered the apartment 
building at 260 Prince Street in Newark, New Jersey—a 
premises infested with a criminal element including drug dealers 
and addicts.  At Branch’s criminal trial the parties sharply 
disputed the reason why Branch went to the premises and what 
happened once he was inside.  It is undisputed, however, that 
Branch had some role in the fatal shooting of Randolph Mosley 
in the building.  It is also undisputed that when the police 
arrested Branch on the day following the shooting he had 
possession of the weapon that had been used to kill Mosley.   
Branch testified at the criminal trial that he went to 260 
Prince Street to retrieve $50 that he had paid for “beat,” or fake, 
cocaine at that premises.  He said that he obtained the drugs 
from Phillip Murphy, who was outside of the building serving as 
a lookout for drug dealers inside the building.  Murphy multi-
tasked as he also procured drugs from a dealer inside when a 
purchaser arrived.  Branch determined that the dealer supplying 
his cocaine gave him a product that was partially baking soda 
and he wanted a refund of the purchase price.  Branch, though 
he claims to have been unarmed, insisted that he and Murphy go 
inside the building to get his money back but he soon found out 
that in the narcotics retail market all sales are final.  Upon 
entering, Branch saw eight to ten people, including Kenneth 
Dortch, Michael Davis, and Patricia Lee, standing against the 
walls.   
Branch testified that, addressing everyone in the hallway, 
he asked who had supplied the beat cocaine.  Branch contended 
that Lee responded by pulling out a gun and telling Branch to 
“get the fuck out of here.”  J.A. 263.  Branch—a slender man of 
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5’5”—rushed the taller Lee to avoid getting shot.  Though 
someone tried to intercept Branch from behind, he managed to 
get his hands on Lee’s wrist.  In the ensuing scramble Lee and 
Branch fell to the floor and, according to Branch, as they fell 
Lee’s gun discharged firing bullets that struck Mosley.  Branch 
claims that when he was on the floor, he overheard Lee 
remarking that she thought she had shot Mosley.  In a critical 
assertion, he states that Lee dropped her gun at a place within 
his reach, so he grabbed it and ran out of the building.  But Lee 
obtained a second gun and joined a group of four individuals 
that chased him down the street.  Branch, however, eventually 
eluded his pursuers and escaped.  
Branch called two witnesses who confirmed his account 
of the events.  First, Davis, who was at 260 Prince Street when 
Branch sought his refund, indirectly corroborated Branch’s 
reason for going inside the building as Davis testified that he, 
too, had purchased bad cocaine from Lee.  Moreover, Davis 
heard Branch complain to Lee about the “beat” drugs and then 
saw Lee pull out a gun and start “tussling” with Branch.  Davis 
testified that Lee’s gun went off two or three times, and he then 
ran out of the building.     
Branch also called Keith Barnhill, Mosley’s childhood 
friend, as a witness.  Although Barnhill was not present at the 
time of the shooting, he testified that he later had a conversation 
with Lee in which she largely confirmed Branch’s description of 
Mosley’s shooting.  Barnhill testified that Lee told him that 
Branch complained to her about the sale of bad cocaine, that she 
pulled a gun on him, and that “they got into a struggle.”  He also 
testified that Lee “was saying that she thinks she might have 
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shot [Mosley].”  J.A. 246-47.  
The State called several eyewitnesses who contradicted 
Branch’s account.  The collective thrust of their testimony was 
that Branch went to the building to rob its occupants and ended 
up shooting and killing Mosley.  Murphy stated that Branch 
came to 260 Prince Street to purchase cocaine and that he, 
Murphy, went into the building to obtain the cocaine.  At that 
time, instead of paying him for the cocaine, Branch took out a 
gun, pointed it at Murphy, and told him to lead the way inside.  
As he entered, Branch exclaimed, “all-right, mother-fuckers, this 
is a stick-up.”  J.A. 72.  Everyone then followed his command to 
put their hands up against the wall.  According to Murphy, 
Branch ordered him to get his “stash,” thus giving Murphy the 
opportunity to run upstairs to his apartment.  When Murphy got 
upstairs, he heard gunshots and came down to see Mosley 
bleeding on the ground.  Following the incident, Murphy told 
one of the investigators that Lee openly wondered if she had 
shot Mosley.      
Dortch supplied additional details.  Though his testimony 
is confusing, we understand that he claimed that he was outside 
of 260 Prince Street when Branch arrived, and that Branch 
robbed him of money when he was going inside and took 
cocaine from Murphy.  Dortch testified that when Branch 
entered the building, he robbed Lee but overlooked her “little” 
gun (“maybe a .22 or .25[mm]”), J.A. 129-30, which she took 
out to shoot him; Branch shot back.   Like Murphy, Dortch also 
conceded that Lee originally thought that she had shot Mosley, 
quoting her saying, “oh, my God, I think I got [Mosley].”  J.A. 
131-32.   
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The State called Lee and Eddie Ratchford as additional 
eyewitnesses.  Lee, who was a defendant in unrelated pending 
criminal proceedings, testified for the State in the hope of 
obtaining favorable treatment in those cases.  Lee testified that 
Branch walked into 260 Prince Street, shooting and demanding 
drugs.  She said that Mosley fled when Branch fired a warning 
shot as he entered the building.  She also testified that while 
Branch was waiting for delivery of cocaine, he robbed her, 
taking her jewelry, coat, and money.  Lee said that Branch 
patted her down but did not notice a gun which she then used to 
shoot at Branch as he was leaving the building.  According to 
Lee, Branch fired back at her, but, instead, hit Mosley who had 
reentered the building.  Lee admitted that she originally thought 
she had shot Mosley.   
The next witness, Ratchford, stated only that he came 
downstairs from his apartment in the middle of the “stick-up,” 
and that when he exited the elevator, he saw a man with a “big 
gun” that “[c]ould have been like a nine millimeter.”  J.A. 207.  
At first, Ratchford identified that man as Branch to the police, 
though at trial he said that he did not have an independent 
recollection of the incident or of the identification he had given. 
  
Although the witnesses testifying to the events at 260 
Prince Street for Branch and the prosecution recounted two 
irreconcilable and confusing versions of the events, they had one 
thing in common: long records of criminal activity, some 
involving violent crimes.  Inasmuch as the witnesses were asked 
about their criminal records, the jury was well aware of their 
criminal backgrounds.   
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In addition to the witnesses from the criminal world, the 
State offered witnesses from a different milieu.  The officer who 
arrested Branch testified that when he was attempting to arrest 
Branch, Branch ran from him, fought him, and even tried to pull 
a weapon as the officer was arresting him.  A ballistics expert, 
Detective Gary Prystauk, explained that the weapon was the 
nine millimeter gun used to fire the bullets that struck Mosley.  
Prystauk did not test the gun for fingerprints because it had not 
been seized immediately after the crime.  The State’s next 
witness, Dr. Joan Obe, described the places where the two 
bullets entered Mosley’s body.  The first bullet hit Mosley in the 
chest and passed through multiple organs; the second entered the 
back of his knee.  She testified that at least one of the shots that 
hit Mosley had not been fired at close range.     
The jury, hearing these confusing and conflicting 
eyewitness accounts and inconclusive expert testimony, quite 
clearly was torn, and understandably sent a number of questions 
to the court during deliberations seeking assistance.  Thus, it 
asked why Branch had not been charged with armed robbery of 
Lee as the jury knew that he had been charged with robbing 
Mosley, Murphy, and Dortch and there was testimony that he 
also robbed Lee.  It also asked whether Lee had been charged 
with any crime, whether the police had found the bullets that 
struck any part of the hallway, and whether it could obtain 
additional information about Lee.  When the New Jersey 
Supreme Court reviewed the jury’s stream of questions on 
Branch’s direct appeal from his convictions, it said that the jury 
was, “[o]bviously struggling with a cast of characters that 
included three drug pushers, one of whom was armed with a 
gun, and a disgruntled drug buyer, who was also said to be 
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armed.”  State v. Branch, 714 A.2d 918, 923-24 (N.J. 1998).   
Despite its apparent reservations, the jury found Branch 
guilty of a homicide offense in Mosley’s killing, as it convicted 
him, among other crimes, of felony murder, aggravated 
manslaughter, and resisting arrest.   But it acquitted him of 
purposeful murder and of robbing Mosley, Murphy, and Dortch. 
 In October 2005, after direct state appellate proceedings and 
two remands of his case to the trial court with results that we 
need not describe, the trial court sentenced Branch to life in 
prison for aggravated manslaughter.  Branch appealed again but 
the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision in relevant part.  As we have 
indicated, Branch unsuccessfully sought state PCR relief after 
which he initiated these habeas corpus proceedings. 
 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 When Branch petitioned for post-conviction relief in the 
state courts he based his petition, among other grounds, on 
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Branch 
included with his petition to the PCR court sworn statements 
predating the start of his trial from the two potential witnesses.  
Their statements tended to corroborate Branch’s trial testimony, 
but Branch’s trial counsel did not call them to testify.  
In a “certification of oath” dated August 10, 1994, one of 
the uncalled witnesses, Abdul Samee, essentially verified 
Branch’s account of the events at the time of the shooting, in 
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particular that (1) Branch went to 260 Prince Street to obtain a 
refund for the $50 he spent for fake cocaine, (2) Mosley’s 
shooting was accidental, and (3) Branch fled with Lee’s gun.  
The other uncalled witness, Stan Robinson, gave a more cryptic 
statement, signed on August 1, 1994, averring that Murphy said 
that Lee “was selling beat cocaine because she fuck Geoge [sic], 
money up,” J.A. 346, apparently meaning that Lee had lost 
money for her boss, George Phillips, and was selling inferior or 
bad cocaine to make up for it.   
 Although the state PCR court orally found trial counsel’s 
decision not to call the two witnesses “more troubling” than 
other issues Branch raised in his petition, J.A. 362, it concluded 
that Branch had not established a prima facie case for relief, a 
prerequisite for a PCR court to require an evidentiary hearing on 
the petition.  The court explained that trial counsel chose to call 
certain witnesses who “stood for the proposition for which they 
were called,” J.A. 363-64, and the additional witnesses only 
could have repeated the same “cumulative” testimony, J.A. 364. 
 The PCR court concluded that even if Branch’s counsel had 
called the witnesses there was no “reasonable probability that 
the outcome would have been different.”  J.A. 364.   
The PCR court adhered to its oral ruling in a subsequent 
written opinion but added that it believed that Branch’s trial 
counsel must have made a strategic determination with respect 
to the use of the two potential witnesses.  First, the court 
repeated its belief that the proposed testimony from the two 
witnesses would not have changed the result at the trial because 
it would have covered the same ground as Davis’s and 
Barnhill’s testimony.  The PCR court believed that Davis 
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offered information that the uncalled witnesses could not have 
offered.  Second, the court held that trial counsel’s omission in 
not calling these witnesses was potentially strategic.  The court 
did not set forth the details of the purported strategy beyond 
paraphrasing the State’s argument that “it is possible that neither 
of the proposed witnesses [was] available to the defense attorney 
at the time of trial or that perhaps they had prior criminal records 
that would damage their credibility.”  J.A. 374.  
 The Appellate Division affirmed the order denying PCR 
relief “substantially for the reasons expressed” by the PCR 
court.  J.A. 385.  With respect to most of Branch’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, including the claim based on 
counsel’s failure to call Robinson and Samee as witnesses, the 
court stated only that the arguments were “without sufficient 
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.”2  J.A. 385.   
 Following the exhaustion of his state remedies, Branch 
filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the District Court.  In the 
habeas corpus proceedings, Branch claimed, as he had in the 
                                                 
2
The Appellate Division did reverse the PCR court on one 
ground not at issue here:  it remanded the case to the PCR court 
for an evidentiary hearing on Branch’s claim that his counsel 
had been ineffective for not requesting a charge of 
passion/provocation manslaughter.  The PCR court held a 
hearing on this issue at which Branch’s trial counsel testified.  
The PCR court subsequently rejected this claim and, on appeal, 
the Appellate Division affirmed; the New Jersey Supreme Court 
denied Branch’s petition for certification including on the 
effective assistance of claim at issue here.   
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PCR court, that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he 
failed to investigate the two witnesses even though Branch, prior 
to the trial, had provided their statements to him along with 
information about their whereabouts.  J.A. 409-12.  The District 
Court denied Branch’s petition, quoting extensively from the 
PCR court’s opinion without substantially expanding on it.  
Rather, it simply indicated that the state courts properly 
identified and applied the governing Supreme Court standard as 
set forth in Strickland and “[t]he decisions of the state courts 
were not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
based on the evidence presented to them.”  J.A. 30.  The District 
Court denied Branch a certificate of appealability, but on 
September 25, 2013, we granted Branch a certificate of 
appealability and directed that counsel be appointed to represent 
him.
3
 
   
IV.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Branch’s habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Because the District Court did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing and, instead, based its decision on its 
review of the state court record, we apply a plenary standard of 
review of its decision and order.  Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 
                                                 
3
 We note that students from Duke University School of Law 
have represented Branch on this appeal with great skill.  We 
thank them—and Elyse Lyons, who argued this appeal, in 
particular—for this fine representation. 
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189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Even though our review of the District Court’s order is 
plenary, we analyze the state PCR court’s decision with 
considerable deference.  Congress, by its enactment of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the 
“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254, which is applicable to this 
case, significantly limited the federal courts’ power to grant a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Thus, under the AEDPA a district court 
may grant a petition for habeas corpus based on a claim that a 
state court previously had rejected on the merits only if the state 
court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim had been “based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), or, as is more 
pertinent to this appeal, if the state court’s decision “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).   
A state court’s decision is “contrary to clearly established 
federal law if it (1) contradicts the governing law set forth in 
[the Supreme] Court’s cases or (2) confronts a set of facts that 
are materially indistinguishable from [those in] a decision of 
[the Supreme] Court and [the state court] nevertheless arrives at 
a [different] result.”  Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 413 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (first, third, and fifth alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A state court decision unreasonably 
applies clearly established law if it either “unreasonably applies 
[the law] to the facts” of the case or “unreasonably extends,” or 
fails to extend, Supreme Court precedent in the case before it.  
Id.  
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Congress has effectuated its intention to limit the 
circumstances in which a federal court may grant a writ of 
habeas corpus by requiring a petitioner to surmount a high 
barrier as a prerequisite for the court to grant him the writ.  As 
the Supreme Court has put it, “[a] state court’s determination 
that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long 
as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the 
state court’s decision.”  Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, __, 
131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Nevertheless, if the state courts unreasonably applied 
federal law in rejecting Branch’s petition, the District Court 
should have reviewed Branch’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim de novo.  See Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 138 (3d 
Cir. 2011); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953, 
127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007) (“When a state court’s adjudication 
of a claim is dependent on an antecedent unreasonable 
application of federal law, the requirement set forth in § 
2254(d)(1) is satisfied.  A federal court must then resolve the 
claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”); 
Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief 
simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such 
error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de 
novo the constitutional issues raised.”).      
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
The governing standard for ineffective-assistance-of-
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counsel claims emanates from the seminal decision in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).  Strickland 
supplied a two-prong test:  counsel’s performance must have 
been deficient and this deficiency must have prejudiced the 
defense.  In this case, no court, state or federal, has held an 
evidentiary hearing at which Branch’s trial counsel had an 
opportunity to explain why he did not call Robinson and Samee 
to testify at the trial as exculpatory witnesses.
4
  Accordingly, we 
                                                 
4
 We note that Branch claimed before the PCR court and the 
District Court that his trial counsel failed to interview and 
investigate potential witnesses Samee and Robinson properly.  
See Mem. of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus Relief 20-28; 
Appellant’s Consent Motion to Modify the Record.  Da51-52, 
89-91.  He also raises this issue in passing in his brief on appeal. 
 Appellant’s br. at 51.  The PCR court found that Branch had 
“failed to meet his burden of providing competent evidence that 
trial counsel’s representation was in any way deficient.”  J.A. 
373.  Specifically, it noted that nothing existed “to suggest . . . 
that the decisions of trial counsel were” uninvestigated.  J.A. 
373.  Branch does not argue on appeal that the PCR court erred 
in placing the burden on him to show a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance under Strickland.  Nor do his briefs cite 
any evidence in the record to support his claim that his trial 
counsel failed to investigate Samee and Robinson properly.  
Indeed, he concedes that counsel may have interviewed the 
witnesses.  See Appellant’s br. at 51 (noting that an evidentiary 
hearing could resolve factual issues such as “whether counsel 
interviewed the witnesses”).  However, we must determine 
whether the state court reasonably applied Strickland based on 
the bare record before it, which, as far as we are aware, did not 
  18 
must ground our decision on the bare record developed in the 
state courts.
5
   
On the record as it now stands, we cannot find any 
justification for counsel not calling these two individuals as 
witnesses at Branch’s trial.  The record does not support the 
PCR court’s conclusion that trial counsel may have had 
legitimate strategic reasons for not calling these witnesses and 
therefore its conclusion was an unreasonable application of 
Strickland.  We also find that there is a reasonable probability 
that this omission prejudiced Branch because if those potential 
witnesses had testified consistently with their pretrial statements, 
the verdict could have been different at Branch’s criminal trial.  
As we conclude that no fair-minded jurist could disagree with 
our finding that the PCR court’s conclusion was incorrect, 
Harrington, ____ U.S. at ____, 131 S.Ct. at 786, we also find 
                                                                                                             
contain any evidence of trial counsel’s efforts—or lack 
thereof—with respect to investigating or interviewing the 
witnesses.  See Cullen v. Pinholster, __U.S.__, __, 131 S.Ct. 
1388, 1398 (2011).  “[T]he absence of evidence cannot 
overcome the ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’”  
Burt v. Titlow, __ U.S. __, __, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013).  Given 
these limitations, we believe it appropriate to focus only on what 
we know: that Branch’s trial counsel did not call Samee and 
Robinson to testify at trial. 
 
5
 Branch’s trial counsel did testify at an evidentiary hearing in 
the PCR court, but on a different issue than that with which we 
are concerned.  See supra note 2. 
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that the PCR court’s conclusion was an unreasonable application 
of Strickland.  Accordingly, Branch has satisfied the 
“unreasonable application” prong of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
A. Deficient Performance 
Although the state PCR court grounded its decision 
primarily on Strickland’s prejudice prong, we begin our analysis 
by examining counsel’s performance at trial.  To obtain habeas 
corpus relief, Branch must show that his counsel’s performance 
was so inadequate that he “was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment,”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, and that the PCR court’s failure to so 
conclude was an unreasonable application of Strickland.   
Strickland’s test is demanding as there is a “strong” presumption 
that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.”  Burt v. Titlow, __ U.S. __, __,134 S.Ct. 10, 17 
(2013).  Even when the petitioner can point to evidence 
supporting a conclusion that in some respects counsel was 
deficient, the standard for prevailing under the first prong of 
Strickland remains stringent:  a petitioner must establish that, 
“in light of all the circumstances,” counsel’s mistake was so 
egregious that it fell “outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 
2066.  A court must assess “counsel’s reasonableness . . . on the 
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 
conduct.”  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2005).   
Where, as here, the petitioner claims that his counsel had 
been ineffective for failing to call potentially important 
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exculpatory witnesses,  the assessment of trial counsel’s 
judgment requires another layer of deference: we are “required 
not simply to give [the] attorney[ ] the benefit of the doubt, but 
to affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons 
[petitioner’s] counsel may have had for proceeding as [he] did.” 
 Cullen v. Pinholster, __U.S.__, __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) 
(first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Thus, the nexus of the AEDPA and Strickland 
compels us to be “doubly deferential,” and “give[] both the state 
court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.”  Burt, 
__ U.S. at __, 134 S.Ct. at 13 (quoting Pinholster, __ U.S. at __, 
131 S.Ct. at 1403.)        
 Branch argues that his trial counsel provided him with 
unreasonably deficient representation when he failed to call 
Samee and Robinson as witnesses at his trial.  Branch claims 
that taken together, these potential witnesses could have: (1) 
corroborated his account of the events at 260 Prince Street at the 
time of the shooting, and (2) discredited the State’s witnesses 
who contradicted his version of the events.  Specifically, Branch 
contends that Samee, as one of his only two eyewitnesses to the 
shooting—the other being Davis—would have confirmed that 
Lee pulled out the nine millimeter gun, and that its discharge 
was accidental.  Samee also would have explained that Lee 
obtained a second, smaller gun by running upstairs and 
retrieving it.   
Robinson, for his part, would have given evidence 
impeaching one of the State’s witnesses, Murphy, with a prior 
inconsistent statement.  Robinson would have testified that, 
contrary to Murphy’s statements at trial, Murphy told Robinson 
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that Lee was selling “beat cocaine” and that Branch entered 260 
Prince Street to complain about that cocaine.  Robinson also 
would have given evidence that Lee, not Branch, drew a gun, 
and that Branch fled with that gun.    
 Branch contends that these witnesses’ statements did not 
repeat testimony presented at trial—because, as described 
above, these witnesses could have offered information that other 
witnesses did not—and their testimony was not “cumulative” 
because it went to a “central and hotly contested issue.”  
Appellant’s br. at 33.  He supports the latter assertion with our 
opinion in United States v. Bergrin, in which we observed that 
testimony that would have “added much to the probative force 
of the other evidence in the case and contribut[ed] to the 
determination of truth . . . cannot properly be said to be 
cumulative.”  682 F.3d 261, 280 n.23 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 On the record before the state court, we see no reason 
why Branch’s trial counsel did not call the potential witnesses at 
Branch’s trial.  The PCR court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s 
decision not to call these witnesses was an exercise of 
reasonable trial strategy was an unreasonable application of 
federal law.  After all, rather than addressing matters that were 
peripheral or that other testimony covered adequately and 
conclusively, Samee’s and Robinson’s written statements 
addressed matters that at trial were both sharply disputed and 
critical.  See Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 
2011) (finding that testimony about a fact conceded by the 
prosecution and consistent with its theory of the case was 
cumulative); United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 (7th 
  22 
Cir. 1996) (defining “cumulative evidence” as evidence that 
“adds very little to the probative force of the other evidence in 
the case, so that if it were admitted its contribution to the 
determination of truth would be outweighed by its contribution 
to the length of the trial”).   
The situation here is similar to that which we considered 
recently in Grant v. Lockett, in that we face the question of why 
having another “eyewitness testify that the defendant was not 
the shooter would have been ‘cumulative.’”  709 F.3d 224, 239 
(3d Cir. 2013) (reversing denial of a habeas petition on the 
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel).  In Grant, the 
defendant was convicted of murder primarily on the basis of the 
testimony of one eyewitness.  Id. at 227.  But two other 
eyewitnesses contradicted this testimony and testified that the 
defendant was not the shooter.  Id.  There were two more 
witnesses who also would have denied that the defendant was 
the shooter but the defense attorney did not call them to testify.  
Id. at 227-28.  The district court concluded that this additional 
testimony would have been “cumulative” because it would have 
repeated the testimony of other witnesses.  Id. at 239.  But the 
uncalled witnesses had executed affidavits that exonerated the 
defendant and went to the very heart of the prosecution’s case 
by identifying another person as the shooter.  Id. at 239-40.
6
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 See also Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(finding counsel’s performance deficient where he failed to call 
two eyewitnesses related to defendant who could have 
corroborated his account and impeached prosecution’s witness); 
Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“Washington’s whereabouts on the day of the robbery was far 
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The testimony of the two uncalled witnesses in Branch’s case 
was almost as significant.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how the 
jury could have returned a guilty verdict against Branch on the 
homicide charges if it credited their testimony.   
The State counters that Branch’s defense theory left one 
void—what it calls “the crux of the case”—that neither witness 
could have filled: a plausible explanation for why Branch would 
have entered 260 Prince Street unarmed to demand a refund 
from hardened drug dealers, surely a perilous undertaking.  
Appellees’ br. at 21-22.  In these circumstances, the jury could 
have doubted the credibility of Branch’s explanation of why he 
entered the building.  Yet even though Branch contends that he 
followed what was an obviously dangerous path when he 
entered 260 Prince Street, he also reasonably contends that 
competent counsel would not have withheld testimony that 
would have provided critical details corroborating his account of 
the events at the time of the shooting.   
 In addition to challenging the plausibility of Branch’s 
defense as part of its argument that Branch’s counsel’s 
representation of Branch was not deficient, the State offers 
several other explanations why trial counsel did not call the 
potential witnesses, but we do not find any persuasive.  In 
considering these explanations, as we mentioned above, we 
must go beyond giving trial counsel “the benefit of the doubt” as 
                                                                                                             
from established—it was the issue in the case.  The fact that 
Pickens had already testified to facts consistent with 
Washington’s alibi did not render additional testimony 
cumulative.”).     
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we are required to “affirmatively entertain” counsel’s potential 
reasons for not calling Samee and Robinson as witnesses.  
Pinholster, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 1407.  But the State’s 
attempts fail because “courts may not indulge post hoc 
rationalization for counsel’s decisionmaking that contradicts the 
available evidence.”  Harrington, __U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 790.  
Purporting to retrace counsel’s steps, the State argues that 
Samee’s testimony would have been inconsistent with Branch’s 
explanation of what happened.  It explains that, in summation, 
Branch’s counsel argued that his client was asking for a return 
of his money in a reasonable way, hoping that the dealer was 
“honorable.”  Samee, on the other hand, in his statement 
described an assertive Branch who threw the bad cocaine on the 
floor with a warning that no one should buy it.  
Yet Samee’s statement is not inconsistent with Branch’s 
testimony.  At trial, Branch did not describe himself as a 
particularly amicable visitor offering pleasantries and charm in 
seeking his refund.  Instead, he said that he burst in and 
demanded to know who sold the “beat” drugs: “the first thing I 
said when I went inside was who Murphy came in here and got 
some cocaine from and then they just looked at me like I was 
crazy.”  J.A. 263.  Moreover, if Samee repeated the contents of 
his written statement when testifying, trial counsel could have 
adjusted his closing statement to conform with the evidence.  In 
any event, regardless of possible inconsistencies between trial 
counsel’s argument and Samee’s statement, the inconsistencies 
are insignificant when compared to the importance of Samee’s 
testimony to Branch’s defense as Samee’s account of Branch’s 
entry into 260 Prince Street corroborated Branch’s testimony on 
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that point.  
The State’s explanation for why Branch’s counsel did not 
call Robinson as a witness is even weaker.  The State finds 
contradictions where we do not—between Robinson’s statement 
that Branch “got the gun out of her hand” and Branch’s 
recollection that he heard the gun drop.  Appellees’ br. at 24-25. 
 Yet the State concedes that the accounts can be reconciled.  Id. 
at 24 (allowing that Robinson “could have meant Branch 
knocked or forced [the gun] out of her hand”).  We agree.  And 
again, even if this statement had been inconsistent with Branch’s 
testimony, the value of Robinson’s statements outweighs the 
significance of the differences.  That is particularly true as 
Robinson was not an eyewitness and merely was recounting 
what Murphy had told him, thus making his description of how 
the gun was displaced from Lee’s hand understandably 
imprecise and much less significant than his recitation of 
Murphy’s admission.7   
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 As the State correctly points out, Robinson’s testimony at least 
would have impeached Murphy’s testimony, which is significant 
as Murphy was a key witness for the prosecution.   We note also 
that when the trial court admitted Barnhill’s testimony it 
overruled the prosecution’s hearsay objection and thus it 
allowed Barnhill to describe what Lee had told him about the 
incident.  We see no reason why trial counsel, after having 
cleared the hearsay hurdle once, would have withheld 
Robinson’s statement out of a concern that the court would not 
have admitted it for the truth of its content.   
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The same is true of the tension that the State finds 
between the witnesses’ statements that Branch grabbed Lee’s 
gun and Branch’s testimony that he grabbed her wrist and took 
her gun after she dropped it.  Id. at 25.  The witnesses’ brief 
statements essentially summarized Branch’s more detailed 
account.  Branch described step by step how he came to possess 
Lee’s gun; Samee and Robinson stated more succinctly that 
Branch grabbed Lee’s gun, omitting the intermediate step that 
he grabbed her wrist first and that the gun discharged while they 
struggled.  Though it is true that Samee’s statement did indicate 
that Branch “grabbed the gun to get it out of [Lee’s] hand,” J.A. 
344, it would be expected that essentially consistent accounts of 
the event would vary to some degree given the chaotic situation 
at 260 Prince Street.  Overall, we see little or no inconsistency 
between Branch’s account on the one hand and Samee’s and 
Robinson’s more abbreviated accounts on the other hand.   
Thus, the record as it was developed in the state courts 
disclosed no reason—strategic or otherwise—to support trial 
counsel’s failure to call Samee and Robinson as witnesses.  
Their pretrial statements tended to exculpate Branch and aligned 
almost perfectly with Branch’s account of what happened at 260 
Prince Street.  The PCR court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s 
decision not to call these witnesses was a reasonable trial 
strategy was an unreasonable application of federal law.  
Consequently, we continue on and analyze whether counsel’s 
performance could have prejudiced Branch at the trial.   
B. Prejudice 
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In the PCR court’s evaluation of the prejudice question, 
Strickland required it to determine whether “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.  Branch was not required to 
establish that his “counsel’s deficient performance more likely 
than not altered the outcome of the case”; he only must have 
shown “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Grant, 709 F.3d at 235 (internal quotation mark 
omitted).  We look to the “totality of the evidence at trial,” 
meaning that “a verdict . . . only weakly supported by the record 
is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support.”  Id.   
We often have said that this standard is not “stringent.”  
See, e.g., Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 502 (3d Cir. 2005).  
In fact, it is “less demanding than the preponderance standard.” 
 Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001).  See 
also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22, 123 S.Ct. 357, 359 
(2002) (observing that Strickland “specifically rejected the 
proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than 
not that the outcome would have been altered”).  But see 
Harrington, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 792 (“[T]he difference 
between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-
than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  At the same time, as the 
Supreme Court recently cautioned, the “likelihood of a different 
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”  Id. at __, 131 
S.Ct. at 792.  We therefore ask whether the state courts 
unreasonably concluded that there was not a substantial 
likelihood that Samee’s and Robinson’s testimony would have 
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changed the outcome of Branch’s trial. 
We start our prejudice analysis by pointing out that no 
fair-minded jurist would agree with the state courts’ finding that 
Samee’s and Robinson’s testimony would not have materially 
aided Branch’s case.  These witnesses would have verified 
Branch’s account of what happened at 260 Prince Street and 
undermined the State’s case, which, even in the absence of their 
unheard evidence, was far from airtight.  But our prejudice 
analysis goes beyond considering the significance of the missing 
evidence for, in accordance with Grant’s admonition, we go on 
to consider the record as a whole so that we can evaluate the 
weaknesses in the State’s case.  See Grant, 709 F.3d at 238.  
The State called witnesses who stated that Lee thought 
she had shot Mosley.  This testimony is difficult to square with 
the prosecution’s theory of the case, particularly when coupled 
with Lee’s account placing both Mosley and Branch by the door, 
and Dr. Obe’s testimony that at least one of Mosley’s wounds 
was inflicted from a gun not fired at close range.  The image that 
the prosecution painted was one of Mosley getting caught in the 
crossfire—after he inexplicably reentered a hallway in which 
Branch already had fired a shot—standing in between Lee and 
Branch, but much closer to Branch than to Lee.  But Mosley’s 
wounds suggested that he more likely was struck by a shot that 
Lee fired, as she was the shooter at a greater distance from 
Mosley.
8
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We do not have the benefit of a diagram that Lee drew at trial 
that purported to demonstrate the positions of all the individuals 
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The State’s case had other weaknesses.  All of its 
eyewitnesses to the events at 260 Prince Street had criminal 
records.  Indeed, perhaps sensing the jury’s unease with his 
witnesses, the prosecutor reminded it in summation that “when 
you cast a play in hell you don’t have angels for characters.”  
J.A. 303.  Lee, who seems to have been the prosecution’s most 
important witness, had used 15 aliases and has a criminal history 
reflecting the commission of violent crimes.  Moreover, it is fair 
to infer that Lee knew that she stood to benefit in two ways from 
Branch’s conviction.  First, because she was testifying under a 
grant of use immunity, she surely knew that if the jury convicted 
Branch it would have validated her testimony.  Second, she must 
have recognized that if Branch was convicted her bargaining 
position would have been enhanced in the other pending cases in 
which she was a defendant.   
Another weakness in the State’s case was that one of its 
critical witnesses, Murphy, was Lee’s underling, and a heroin 
addict to boot, who admitted to consuming a “bag, bag and a 
half [of heroin] a day.”  J.A. 85-86.  It is fair to infer that 
Murphy was motivated to vouch for Lee’s version of the events, 
in which she had a secondary role in Mosley’s shooting.  And 
the State’s witnesses had the opportunity to harmonize their 
testimony as they admitted to discussing the events with one 
another prior to their police interviews.   
In addition, the physical evidence was inconclusive and 
even might have favored Branch.  We recognize that, when 
arrested, Branch had the weapon used to shoot Mosley, though 
                                                                                                             
in the hallway.     
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he offered an explanation of why he nevertheless did not shoot 
Mosley.  In any event, inasmuch as the prosecution’s theory 
included a scenario in which there had been a gunfight between 
Lee and Branch, rather than, as Branch argues, that two shots 
had been fired from Lee’s gun that struck Mosley, the jury 
understandably expected the police to find bullet strikes in the 
walls from Lee’s smaller gun.  When the jury sent the trial court 
a question asking whether the police found “the bullets strike 
anywhere,” J.A. 323, 329, the court indicated to trial counsel 
that it would respond that it did not “know of any such 
testimony,” J.A. 323, but that the jury would have to rely on its 
own recollection of the evidence on the point.  In fact, the police 
did not find any bullet strikes.   
There was yet another physical evidence problem for the 
State because, according to Lee, Branch fired a warning shot 
when he entered 260 Prince Street, and then fired two more 
shots that he aimed at Lee but that struck Mosley.  But the police 
recovered only two shell casings and did not recover any bullet 
strikes.  Judging by the jury’s question to the court the jury was 
aware of the missing shell casing and bullet strike problem.     
We recognize that in summation at trial and in its brief on 
appeal, the State points to the straight paths that the two bullets 
took through Mosley’s body.  The State argues that these paths 
of the bullets refute Branch’s assertion that the gun discharged 
as he and Lee were falling to the floor because if that were true, 
the argument goes, the bullets would have struck Mosley at an 
angle. 
We are not convinced by this logic and note that, as far as 
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we can tell, the State did not make this argument at trial and, in 
any event, did not support it with expert testimony.  Moreover, 
even if a gun is likely to be angled up or down when the person 
holding it is falling, this is not necessarily so as the barrel might 
remain level when the gun drops with the person holding it.  
Here, if anything, the autopsy undercuts the State’s theory 
because Mosley’s two wounds were separated significantly in 
height, one hitting his lungs and the other the back of his knee.  
The State has not explained how Branch’s gun could have 
caused these non-angled bullet wounds while Branch was 
allegedly shooting Lee from about ten feet away.          
And for all of the State’s efforts to find inconsistencies in 
Samee’s and Robinson’s statements, it was the State’s case that 
was plagued by serious contradictions.  The State admits to 
some of these inconsistencies but dismisses them as not going to 
the “major element” of the case.  Appellees’ br. at 32 
(acknowledging that the “prosecution witnesses had various 
inconsistencies”).   
Though we recognize that it is not surprising that the 
witnesses did not describe the chaotic events at 260 Prince 
Street consistently in every detail, still some of the 
contradictions in the State’s case give us pause.  For instance, 
Lee unequivocally testified that, contrary to Murphy’s account, 
Murphy did not enter 260 Prince Street with Branch, and that 
she, in fact, did not even know him.  That evidence, was, of 
course, at odds with Murphy’s testimony that he was there and 
that he even discussed the incident with Lee “not too long after 
it happened.”  J.A. 105.  Whether Murphy—an important 
participant in the State’s version of the events and an 
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eyewitness—was actually in the building at the time of the 
shooting was quite relevant to the State’s case.   
Dortch, for his part, repeatedly struggled to keep his 
testimony consistent with his prior statements to the police and 
to the grand jury as he acknowledged, over and over, that his 
earlier accounts had been inaccurate.  The jury evidently took 
note of his vacillation because effectively it discredited him 
when it acquitted Branch on the robbery counts as the State 
based its case on those counts heavily on Dortch’s testimony.   
Though we have approached our analysis of the PCR 
court’s decision on the prejudice prong of Strickland by 
assessing weaknesses in the State’s case, we are not implying 
that Branch’s defense was strong.  After all, he tried to convince 
the jury that he entered a drug den unarmed to seek a refund for 
his purchase of fake cocaine, that he lunged at a gun that was 
about to be discharged, and that he had possession of the murder 
weapon when the police arrested him only because he grabbed 
the weapon when the real culprit dropped it.  And Branch’s two 
witnesses were felons, brought to the courthouse to testify 
directly from prison.  One of them, Davis, used many different 
names, and, after telling the jury that Branch did not rob anyone, 
he admitted that he, Davis, had been convicted of attempted 
burglary, among other offenses.   
Nevertheless, for purposes of undermining confidence in 
the trial’s outcome Branch’s defense was no less plausible than 
the defense that we accepted as sufficient in a similar context in 
Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 2006).  There, trial 
counsel did not call a witness who would have testified that the 
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defendant, Florencio Rolan, entered an abandoned building 
armed only with a beer bottle to use against the eventual victim 
who was wielding a kitchen knife.  Id. at 682-83.  This 
testimony would have bolstered Rolan’s improbable claim at 
trial that when he entered the building he saw a “loaded rifle 
lying nearby,” which he picked up to kill the victim in self-
defense.  Id. at 674, 683.  We “marvel[ed] at Rolan’s 
serendipitous rifle” but we saw enough holes in the 
prosecution’s case for Rolan to have satisfied Strickland’s 
prejudice inquiry when focusing on trial counsel’s failure to call 
the beer bottle witness at trial, rendering the state court’s 
conclusion to the contrary unreasonable on habeas corpus 
review.  Id. at 683.  By comparison, Branch’s defense, while 
also a bit strained, is more believable than Rolan’s.   
Given the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case and our 
conclusion based on their statements that Samee and Robinson 
would have materially aided Branch’s case, we find that fair-
minded jurists would not disagree that there was a reasonable 
probability that Samee’s and Robinson’s testimony at trial 
would have changed the jury’s verdict.  Accordingly, in the 
absence of an explanation from Branch’s trial counsel as to why 
he did not call Samee and Robinson as witnesses, we find the 
state courts’ application of Strickland’s second prong to have 
been unreasonable.  As a result, the District Court should have 
made a de novo review of Branch’s ineffective assistance claim.  
C. Evidentiary Hearing 
We are satisfied from our review of the case that the 
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District Court, when reviewing Branch’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, should have conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and that it abused its discretion when it failed to do so.  See 
Grant, 709 F.3d at 229 (reviewing district court’s “denial of an 
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion”).  We are aware that 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) bars federal habeas corpus courts from 
holding evidentiary hearings if “the applicant has failed to 
develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” 
 But that prohibition does not apply in this case because Branch 
unsuccessfully sought an evidentiary hearing in the PCR court 
and unsuccessfully appealed from the denial of his PCR petition. 
 We therefore cannot attribute the incomplete developments of 
all the facts to Branch’s “lack of diligence, or some greater 
fault.”  Thomas, 428 F.3d at 498; see also Hurles v. Ryan, __ 
F.3d __, __, 2014 WL 1979307, at *19 (9th Cir. May 16, 2014) 
(“A petitioner who has previously sought and been denied an 
evidentiary hearing has not failed to develop the factual basis of 
his claim.”).  
Relatedly, the Supreme Court recently held that new 
evidence produced in a hearing before a habeas corpus court 
may not be used to assess whether the state court’s decision 
satisfied 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), that is, whether it was “contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law.”  See Pinholster, __ U.S. at __, 131 
S.Ct. at 1398.  In other words, for purposes of clearing the § 
2254(d)(1) bar to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, the record on 
which a court decides the case ordinarily is frozen when the case 
leaves the state-court system.  But this prohibition against 
expanding the state-court record in a federal court does not 
affect the proceedings on Branch’s petition because, at an 
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evidentiary hearing in the District Court, Branch will rely on the 
witnesses’ pretrial statements that he submitted to the PCR 
court.  Thus, in seeking habeas corpus relief, Branch does not 
base his case on facts that he believes could be developed at a 
hearing in the habeas corpus court. 
As we have explained, we can discern no reason on the 
current record to support counsel’s decision not to call Samee 
and Robinson as witnesses to testify at trial.  Nevertheless, 
because a determination of whether to grant Branch’s petition 
turns on the reasons why his counsel did not call Samee and 
Robinson to testify and those reasons have not been developed 
in the record, an evidentiary hearing is required here.  See, e.g., 
Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1987)  (remanding 
for evidentiary hearing because the record did not reflect 
whether trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to 
present certain evidence); see also Thomas, 428 F.3d at 501 
(“Of course, overcoming the strategic presumption does not, in 
itself, entitle Thomas to relief.  It merely gives him the 
opportunity to show that counsel’s conduct fell below objective 
standards of attorney conduct.”).9    
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 We note that if the state courts had concluded without an 
evidentiary hearing that Branch’s trial counsel’s performance 
had been deficient but nevertheless had denied Branch PCR 
relief because he did not satisfy the prejudice prong of 
Strickland, it is possible that we would have granted Branch’s 
petition without ordering that the District Court hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  See Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr., 434 
U.S. 257, 267 n.10, 98 S.Ct. 556, 562 n.10 (1978) (observing 
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At the hearing Branch’s trial counsel will be able to 
explain the circumstances surrounding his decision not to call 
Samee and Robinson as witnesses.  In this regard, we point out 
that he might have interviewed them and concluded that their 
accounts deviated in significant respects from their written 
statements.  Furthermore, it is possible, as the State seems to 
suggest, that the witnesses did not want to testify and that 
Branch’s counsel may have thought that it would be risky to call 
them to do so.  But to the extent that the state courts adopted 
theoretical justifications for Branch’s counsel not calling  Samee 
and Robinson as witnesses, the courts lacked a factual basis for 
doing so and we will not allow the outcome of this case to 
depend on sheer speculation.  We are satisfied, instead, that the 
District Court should have reviewed Branch’s claim on a de 
novo basis after considering the evidence developed at an 
evidentiary hearing along with the rest of the record before the 
Court.   
                                                                                                             
that courts of appeals have permitted district courts to 
“discharge a habeas corpus petitioner from state custody without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing”); Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 
93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a remand for an evidentiary 
hearing was unnecessary in part because the record negated the 
possibility that counsel’s omission was strategic); Fed. R. 
Governing § 2254 Cases 8 advisory committee’s note 
(commenting that in “unusual cases the court may grant [a 
habeas petition] without a hearing”).  As the case stands, 
however, there are factual questions that must be resolved 
concerning the first Strickland prong before the District Court 
may adjudicate the habeas corpus petition. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s February 11, 2013 order denying Branch’s petition for 
habeas corpus relief and will remand the case to the District 
Court for an evidentiary hearing on Branch’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
